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Whistling in the Wind: Why Federal
Whistleblower Protections Fall Short of
their Corporate Governance Goals
Meera Khan*
Teetering on the line between hero and villain, whistleblowers
have a remarkably unusual role in contemporary American
society. Those who blow the whistle on public sector activities,
like Edward Snowden and the Watergate Scandal’s “Deep
Throat”, are often vilified in history as treasonous and
unprincipled rogues. In the private sector, however,
whistleblowers are seen as moral compasses for corporate
behavior, and are even afforded federal protections for speaking
out against internal malfeasance. The piecemeal evolution of
whistleblower legislation including the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of
2002 and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 created regulatory and enforcement
failures that ultimately diminish whistleblower protections, and in
turn, thwart corporate governance.
While whistleblower protection is generally a bipartisan issue,
proponents and critics disagree on the level of regulation required
in order to ensure successful corporate compliance and
governance. The Wells Fargo cross–selling scandal of 2016
illustrates that instead of sweeping regulatory changes that the
government has pushed in the past, current whistleblower
jurisprudence needs to assess administrative, rather than
regulatory, reform while engaging in micro–level analyses within
*

Executive Editor, University of Miami Business Law Review; Juris Doctor Candidate
2018, University of Miami School of Law; Bachelor of Arts in Political Science 2014,
University of Miami. I would like to thank the stellar Editorial Board of the University of
Miami Business Law Review for all of their hard work; Professor Caroline Bradley for her
guidance and thought–provoking insight throughout the writing process; and, above all,
my parents and sister for always being the beacon of light in my life.

57

58

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:57

companies in order to address the issues that cause the
whistleblower framework to fail at achieving its corporate
governance goals. This note examines challenges and criticisms
regarding the relationship between whistleblowers and effective
corporate governance and, through Wells Fargo, illustrates the
growing need for reform in the administration of whistleblower
protections and procedures.1
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Being a whistleblower is an extraordinarily lonely
existence. You’re putting your livelihood at risk, maybe
your life, and you can’t tell anyone about it. You have to
go through every workday as if everything is normal,
when in fact you’ve made a conscious decision to expose
illegal actions your company is taking, and you’re doing
it with the knowledge that the people you work with are
going to suffer because of that, and some of them may
even go to jail. It’s incredibly tough.2
Blow the whistle on a wolf of Wall Street, become a scapegoat. In the
post–Enron3 collective consciousness, corporate vigilantes who risk their
jobs to protect the public interest and uphold laws are regarded as unsung
heroes; yet there remains a persistent ambivalence when it comes to
utilizing whistleblowers to promote and ensure corporate governance.4
Developments in federal whistleblower protections, including provisions
of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 20025 (hereinafter “Sarbanes–Oxley”) and
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act

2

HARRY MARKOPOLOS, NO ONE WOULD LISTEN: A TRUE FINANCIAL THRILLER 120
(John Wiley & Sons, 2010) (Harry Markopolos is a former securities industry executive
who discovered evidence over nine years suggesting that Bernard Madoff’s wealth
management business, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, was, in fact, a Ponzi
scheme. Markopolos alerted the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission of the fraud in
2000, 2001, and 2005, and supplied supporting documents to no avail. Each time, the SEC
ignored him or only gave his evidence a cursory investigation. Madoff was finally
uncovered as a fraud in December 2008, when his sons ousted him to the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.).
3
See generally Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of
Overlapping Obligations, 97 CAL. L. REV. 433 (2009); The Fall of Enron, http://
www.npr.org/news/specials/enron/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2016).
4
See Richard R. Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 LA. L. REV. 237, 240 (2009).
5
See generally Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2002).
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(hereinafter “Dodd–Frank”),6 merely build castles in the air—making
incremental gains for employees but leaving much to be desired in
achieving corporate accountability.
In the wake of the 2016 Wells Fargo cross–selling scandal7 and
subsequent retaliation class action suits8 filed by former Wells Fargo
employees, whistleblowers are once again at the forefront of corporate
governance discourse. This begs the question: is current whistleblower
jurisprudence effectively achieving its goal of acting as a check on
financial corporations? The Wells Fargo scandal calls for an opportunity
to revisit the legislative intent behind prevailing whistleblower protection
laws and anti–retaliation statutes in order to assess the glaring deficiencies
in the administration and enforcement of these measures. This comment
examines the development and evolution of modern whistleblower
jurisprudence in the corporate context, and the quest for corporate
governance leading up to the Wells Fargo scandal. Part II of this comment
summarizes and explains historical, societal, and contemporary
perspectives on corporate whistleblowing and the evolution of
whistleblower protections and legislation. Part III considers the role
corporate governance plays in the current whistleblower framework and
uses Wells Fargo as a lens to analyze the successes and failures of this
framework. Part IV suggests practical solutions to facilitate regulatory,
administrative, and institutional reform in order to encourage and promote
effective whistleblower protections and corporate governance. Part V
forecasts the state of whistleblower protections and corporate governance
following the transition into the Trump administration. Finally, Part VI
offers concluding thoughts.

6

See generally Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78u–6 (2010).
7
See generally Aaron Back, Wells Fargo’s Questionable Cross–Selling Strategy,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2016 2:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargosquestionable-cross-selling-strategy-1473444334/ (Cross–selling is the practice of selling
an additional product or service to an existing customer. In late 2016, Wells Fargo was
embroiled in controversy when aggressive sales goals resulting in unethical and illegal
cross–selling practices were brought to light by whistleblowing former employees.).
8
See generally Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo Workers Claim Retaliation for Playing by
the Rules, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/09/27/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-workers-claim-retaliation-for-playing-by-therules.html?_r=0/ (A class of current and former Wells Fargo employees sought to file suit
in the Central District of California for being fired or demoted for refusing to participate in
illegal cross–selling practices and, thus, falling short of sales goals.).
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THE RISE AND FALL OF FEDERAL WHISTLEBLOWER
PROTECTIONS
History

Historically, whistleblowers played a contentious role in society.9 The
term “whistleblower” itself has its origins in 19th century British practice
when government, in the form of local unarmed police or “bobbies,”
would “blow the whistle” to alert citizens and seek help in chasing and
apprehending pickpockets and shoplifters.10 Whistleblowing has since
evolved into a sophisticated and complex area of law and regulation.
Modern–day whistleblowers “serve the public as jurors, witnesses,
military reservists, and volunteer emergency responders, despite the
competing demands of their employment.”11 In private sector workplaces,
whistleblowers are often described as “citizen employees.”12 Citizen
employees are individuals who blow the metaphoric whistle out of a sense
of public duty, while potentially risking their jobs, professional relations,
or their employer’s business.13 Recent examples of citizen employees
blowing the whistle typically start out with an individual either
discovering malfeasance on the part of fellow employees or managers, or
resisting instructions to commit or assist in wrongful activity.14 From
there, the whistle–yielding individual may report wrongdoing to
managerial superiors or enforcement authorities.15
Much of the development in whistleblower protection occurred over
the last thirty years, but examples of protective employment laws for
citizen employees date back to the Civil War era.16 Congress enacted the
1863 False Claims Act to encourage private citizens to sue on behalf of
the government in order to lay bare the fraudulent practices of companies
supplying the federal government with deficient goods during the Civil
War.17 More than a century later, legislation has left whistleblowers with
9

See generally Jisoo Kim, Confessions of A Whistleblower: The Need to Reform the
Whistleblower Provision of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 241, 249–50
(2009).
10
HENRI COLT, SILVIA QUADRELLI & LESTER FRIEDMAN, THE PICTURE OF HEALTH:
MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE MOVIES 222 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2014); see also ROBERTA A.
JOHNSON, WHISTLEBLOWING: WHEN IT WORKS – AND WHY 4 (Lynne Rienner Publ’g 2002).
11
Carlson, supra note 4, at 238.
12
Id. at 237.
13
Id. at 237–38.
14
Id. at 238.
15
Id.
16
Mary K. Ramirez, Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection: A Tale of
Reform Versus Power, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 183, 192 (2007).
17
Id. at 192; see also False Claims Act 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2000) (The False
Claims Act (“FCA”) allows a private individual with knowledge of past or present fraud
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unpredictable protections.18 Narrow exceptions declared by courts and
legislatures for whistleblowers provide limited reparation against
employers’ ability to retaliate, and the effectiveness of current anti–
retaliation laws and whistleblower protections remain uncertain.19 For
example, Wells Fargo clearly demonstrates the futile prophylactic effect
whistleblower legislation has on both retaliation and corporate
malfeasance. Regulatory failures that contribute to large–scale corporate
scandals, however, are due, at least in part, to restrictive coverage and
interpretation by courts and agencies as well as procedural or
administrative hurdles that whistleblowers must initially overcome before
proceeding with seeking redress.20
Currently, over fifty federal statutes exist to protect whistleblowers.21
Nearly all states have either statutory or common law whistleblower
protections, and the parameters of these laws vary considerably depending
on the jurisdiction.22 However, legal protection and the resulting corporate
governance remain illusory largely because of the fragmented evolution
of whistleblower protections in the corporate context.23 The recent move
toward an enlargement of whistleblower protections and safeguards
against employer retaliation is credited to the seismic waves of corporate
scandal that shook the financial world in the last 30 years.24 The
development of such laws and legislation was a response to several
influences. In particular, mass fraud resulting from unchecked corporate
accounting practices on Wall Street played a role in the eventual collapse
of some of America’s largest corporations in 2001 as well as the financial
crisis of 2008—ultimately creating the most devastating economic
recession since the Great Depression.25 “Whistleblower laws reacted not
only to particular disasters, but also to a lack of confidence in both private
and public bureaucracies . . . [and] whistleblowers played crucial roles in
publicizing abuses and regulatory violations.”26 The sheer volume of anti–
retaliation laws that emerged in the last three decades illustrate the
committed against the federal government to bring suit on its behalf. The FCA imposes
liability on persons, companies, and contractors who defraud governmental programs, and
it was intended to deal with fraudulent contract claims during the Civil War in which
contractors provided substandard equipment to the Union Army.).
18
See Ramirez, supra note 16, at 192–95.
19
Carlson, supra note 4, at 240.
20
Id. at 240–42.
21
Ramirez, supra note 16, at 191.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
ROBERT G. VAUGHN, THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS 149
(Edward Elgar Publ’g, Inc., 2012).
25
Id. at 149–50.
26
Id. at 150.
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government’s realization that whistleblowers are a “critical component to
effective law enforcement in a complex society as insiders [sic]
furnish[ing] invaluable assistance in the investigation and prosecution of
public corruption and corporate fraud.”27 Endeavoring to root out
corporate fraud, Congress passed two key pieces of legislation protecting
whistleblowers: the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, and the 2010 Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.

B. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002: A Response to the Enron Era
“Enron changed everything.”28 In 2001, the collapse of Enron, one of
the fastest growing corporations in the US, had devastating effects on the
lives of thousands of individuals and created a sense of public distrust
toward large corporations.29 The fall of Enron was followed by the
discovery of rampant corporate corruption, which contributed to the
bankruptcy of WorldCom in mid–2002.30 Immediately thereafter,
Congress passed the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002,31 which contained
provisions affording anti–retaliation protections to employees reporting
violations of federal securities laws at publicly traded corporations.32
Sarbanes–Oxley was meant “[t]o safeguard investors in public companies
and restore trust in the financial markets following the collapse of Enron
Corporation,”33 and, as such, Congress intended for employees, as
corporate insiders, to be afforded federal anti–retaliation protection in
order to encourage the disclosure of wrongdoing and ultimately prevent
future corporate fraud and misconduct.34 Fittingly, TIME magazine

27

Ramirez, supra note 16, at 191.
Chelsea H. Overhuls, Unfinished Business: Dodd–Frank’s Whistleblower Anti–
Retaliation Protections Fall Short for Private Companies and Their Employees, 6 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. ISS. 1, 2–3 (2012).
29
Id.
30
Id.; see also Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, Worldcom’s Collapse: The Overview;
Worldcom Files for Bankruptcy; Largest U.S. Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2002)
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/22/us/worldcom-s-collapse-the-overview-worldcomfiles-for-bankruptcy-largest-us-case.html/.
31
See generally Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2002).
32
Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 107–146, at 2–11 (2002) (showing congressional intent for
Sarbanes–Oxley to create new protections for employees at risk of retaliation for reporting
corporate misconduct).
33
Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1161 (2014) (citing S. REP. NO. 107–146, at
2–11 (2002)).
34
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2002) (Section 1514A
prohibits certain companies from discharging or otherwise “discriminat[ing] against an
employee in the terms and conditions of employment because” the employee “provid[es]
information . . . or otherwise assist[s] in an investigation regarding any conduct which the
employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation” of certain criminal fraud statutes,
28
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declared 2002 the year of the whistleblower and gracing the cover were
Sherron Watkins (Enron whistleblower), Cynthia Cooper (WorldCom
whistleblower), and Coleen Rowley of the FBI as persons of the year.35
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 was a result of political and
economic forces pressuring the legislature to address corporate corruption
and eroding financial markets.36 Sarbanes–Oxley also sought to bolster
corporate accountability by expanding criminal penalties and civil liability
for fraudsters.37 The idea that “existing corporate culture failed to promote
honest business practices and discouraged employees from reporting
dishonest practices”38 was central to Sarbanes–Oxley, and, to address
these concerns, the Act provided a civil cause of action for whistleblowers
employed by publicly traded companies.39 In addition to the whistleblower
provision, Sarbanes–Oxley required that there be channels through which
employees could report anonymously and directly to the audit committee
of the board of directors and that corporate officers, including CEOs, sign
off on financial statements.40 “Congress believed that protecting corporate
whistleblowers encouraged disclosures crucial to the preservation of the
interests of shareholders, employees, and consumers.”41 Particularly, the
Senate drew on the experiences of corporate whistleblowers in drafting the
whistleblower protection provisions of the law:
We included meaningful protection for whistleblowers as
passed by the Senate. We learned from Sherron Watkins
of Enron that these corporate insiders are the key
witnesses that need to be encouraged to report fraud and
help prove it in court . . . there is no way that we could
have known about [the misconduct of corporate officers]
without that kind of whistleblower.42
The whistleblower provision of Sarbanes–Oxley started out as one of
the most comprehensive private–sector whistleblower laws ever enacted
any SEC rule or regulation, or “any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against
shareholders.”); see also S. REP. NO. 107–146, at 2–11 (2002).
35
Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year 2002: The Whistleblowers,
TIME (Dec. 30, 2002), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1003967,00
.html/.
36
Ramirez, supra note 16, at 196–97.
37
See id.
38
Id. at 197 (quotations omitted).
39
Id.
40
See Stephen M. Kohn, Sarbanes–Oxley Act: Legal Protection for Corporate
Whistleblowers, NWC NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWER CTR, http://www.whistleblowers.org/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=27 (last visited Dec. 20, 2016).
41
VAUGHN, supra note 24, at 152.
42
Id. (quoting Senator Patrick Leahy regarding Report of the Conference Committee).
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in the United Stated.43 It provides a cause of action to employees of
publicly–traded companies who allege that they were retaliated against
because they provided information about, or participated in an
investigation relating to, what they reasonably believed constituted mail
fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, securities fraud, or any violation of
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rules and regulations
relating to fraud against shareholders.44

C. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010: A Response to the Financial Crisis of 2008
Paving the way for whistleblower and retaliation protection in
subsequent federal statutes, Sarbanes–Oxley heralded a decade of
congressional enactment of private–sector whistleblower laws, but despite
its implementation, regulatory failures contributed, in large part, to the
financial crisis of 2008.45 Following the market collapse of 2008, Congress
sought to amend and fortify regulation of the financial industry with
reinvigorated zeal in order to ascertain what bred toxic corporate culture,
provide the public with a sense of security, and prevent similar disasters
in the future.46 One of the factors that Congress scrutinized as a facilitator,
if not the instigator, of the collapse was unchecked corporate behavior and
lack of governance and compliance metrics.47 Generally, corporate
governance is “[a] set of principles by which companies are directed and
controlled”,48 and the parties responsible for ensuring effective and
adequate corporate governance include a company’s employees,
managers, directors, shareholders, and the less recognized and often
ignored whistleblowers.49
In 2010, Congress rolled out Dodd–Frank as a sweeping regulatory
solution to the nation’s financial crisis.50 One of the major premises of
Dodd–Frank’s enactment was “[t]o promote the financial stability of the
United States by improving accountability and transparency in the

43

Id. at 152.
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2002).
45
VAUGHN, supra note 24, at 153.
46
Umang Desai, Crying Foul: Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act of
2010, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 427, 428 (2012).
47
Id. (quotations omitted).
48
Id.
49
Id. (quotations omitted).
50
Megan O’Malley, Whistleblower Protections, Retaliation Issues, and Investigative
Issues Arising Under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Dodd–Frank Act, at 5 (July 31,
2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/am/2015/omal
ley.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2018).
44
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financial system.”51 As part of its comprehensive program to ensure
corporate accountability and compliance, Dodd–Frank expanded the
whistleblower protection provision in Section 806 of Sarbanes–Oxley by:
extending the statute of limitations, creating an independent right for
whistleblowers to sue in federal court, and creating measures to ensure that
protections were non–waivable by employees.52 Dodd–Frank also created
whistleblower incentive programs with the SEC and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), both of which rewarded
whistleblowers with a share of any money the government recovered from
their tip.53

D.

Where are we now: Wells Fargo Slips through the Cracks

In each of the biggest financial frauds in modern history, employee
whistleblowers tried to warn others of what was to come, with no avail.
Sherron Watkins of Enron54 wrote a now infamous letter to then CEO
Kenneth Lay, warning that “I am incredibly nervous that we will implode
in a wave of accounting scandals,”55 which had a striking resemblance to
a former Wells Fargo employee’s letter to CEO John Stumpf from 2007:
“[l]eft unchecked, the inevitable outcome shall be one of professional and
reputational damage, consumer fraud and shareholder lawsuits, coupled
by regulatory sanctions.”56
51

Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or Out? The Dodd–Frank Whistleblower Program’s
Antiretaliation Protections for Internal Reporting, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 721, 726 (2014)
(citations omitted).
52
O’Malley, supra note 50, at 6–10.
53
S. REP. NO. 111–176, at 110–12 (2010).
54
See Frank Pellegrini, Person of the Week: Enron Whistleblower Sherron Watkins,
TIME (Jan. 18, 2002), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,194927,00.html/;
see also C. William Thomas, The Rise and Fall of Enron, JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY (Apr.
1, 2002), https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2002/apr/theriseandfallofenron.
html/ (The Enron scandal, publicized in October 2001, eventually led to the bankruptcy of
the Enron Corporation, an American energy company based in Houston, Texas, and the de
facto dissolution of Arthur Andersen, which was one of the five largest audit and
accountancy partnerships in the world. In addition to being the largest bankruptcy
reorganization of its time, Enron has been noted as the biggest audit failure in modern
American history.).
55
Letter from Sherron Watkins, Vice President of Corp. Dev., Enron Corp., to Kenneth
Lay, Chief Exec. Officer, Enron Corp. (August 2001) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of Justice),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/enron/exhibit/03-15/BBC-0001/Images/9811.001.PDF/.
56
Matt Egan, Letter Warned Wells Fargo of ‘Widespread’ Fraud in 2007 – Exclusive,
CNN MONEY (Oct. 18, 2016, 11:23 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/10/18/investing/
wells-fargo-warned-fake-accounts-2007/index.html?iid=hp-stack-dom/ (Former Wells
Fargo CEO John Stumpf testified under oath that he was never notified of illicit cross–
selling issues until 2013. Soon thereafter, however, a 2007 letter addressed to Stumpf
surfaced, in which a Wells Fargo employee warned of widespread wrongful sales practices
and “routine deception and fraudulent exploitation of our clients.”).
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In 2013, the Economist named banking institution Wells Fargo “[t]he
big winner from the financial crisis[,]” owing its success to a “prosaic”
practice of serving customers.57 While these customers were still in the
dark about the truth behind Wells Fargo’s sales practices, rumblings of
fraud and malfeasance were sounding amongst employees and falling on
deaf ears. Until recently. A mere three years later, Wells Fargo’s narrative
quickly shifted from its rise to stardom to its fall from grace. The financial
crisis’ big winner is now a “school for scoundrels,”58 where the prosaic
practice of serving customers was just a thinly veiled attempt to hide
insatiable corporate greed.
Wells Fargo built its reputation eschewing complex financial
instruments and Wall Street, and focusing instead on individual savings
and checking accounts as well as loans for ordinary consumers.59 The bank
owed its growth and success to fostering relationships with customers
through “cross–selling” new accounts—the same practice that left Wells
Fargo fraught with scandal.60 CEO John Stumpf’s mantra was “eight is
great,” which set a target for employees to get eight Wells Fargo products
into the hands of each customer—whether it be savings and checking
accounts, credit cards, mortgages, or car loans.61 As the sales directives
became too demanding to satisfy, employees began to find a different way
to meet the bottom line—eventually more than 2 million accounts were
opened by Wells Fargo employees without customers’ consent or
knowledge, most of which were not discovered by customers until after
news of the scandal broke.62 Those who complained of sales goals or
fraudulent cross–selling tactics were often fired for failing to meet the
target.63 In the wake of the scandal at least 5,300 Wells Fargo employees
were fired for ethics violations that included setting up illicit accounts
without customers’ knowledge in order to meet sales objectives.64 The
biggest losers, however ended up being the whistleblowers: employees
who were fired or demoted for playing by the rules, staying honest, and

57

Wells Fargo: Riding High, ECONOMIST (Sept. 14, 2013), http://www.economist.com/
news/finance-and-economics/21586295-big-winner-financial-crisis-riding-high/.
58
Jana Kasperkevic, ‘School for Scoundrels’: Wells Fargo cuts not Enough for
Outraged US Congress, Guardian (Sept. 29, 2016, 2:07 PM) https://www.theguardian.
com/business/2016/sep/29/wells-fargo-clawbacks-outraged-us-congress/.
59
See Wells Fargo: Riding High, supra note 57.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Mike Mullen, Wells Fargo’s employees tried to warn us about their executives, CITY
PAGES (Nov. 2, 2016), http://www.citypages.com/news/wells-fargos-employees-tried-towarn-us-about-their-executives/399523211.
63
Id.
64
Id.
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falling short of unachievable sales goals.65 The big winner of the financial
crisis turned out to be another Wall Street wolf scapegoating its citizen
employees.

III.

FITTING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INTO THE CURRENT
WHISTLEBLOWER FRAMEWORK
I turned over everything I knew to the SEC. Five times I
reported my concerns, and no one would listen until it was
far too late . . . .66 I don’t know how I could have been
more explicit. I gave them a roadmap and a flashlight . . .
[but] they didn’t go where I told them to go.67

While Harry Markopolos was not a Madoff Investment Securities
employee, he uncovered and blew the whistle on Madoff’s $65 billion
dollar Ponzi scheme on several occasions.68 The SEC’s reluctance to
consider evidence and documentation of fraud that was brought forth by a
quantitative financial specialist highlighted the fact that whistleblowers
and corporate fraud were not being taken seriously. Hence, while the
framework for whistleblowers to report corporate malfeasance is arguably
in place, administrative and legal hurdles often make whistleblower
retaliation a uniquely difficult issue to resolve.

A.

Statutory Interpretation: Internal v. External Reporting

One of Dodd–Frank’s most significant expansions of Sarbanes–
Oxley’s whistleblowing provisions was in allowing employees to proceed
directly to court to sue if their employers retaliated against them for
reporting corporate misconduct.69 While both Acts shield whistleblowers
from retaliation, they differ in important respects. Sarbanes–Oxley applies
to all “employees” who report misconduct to the SEC, any other federal
agency, Congress, or an internal supervisor;70 Dodd–Frank, on the other
hand, defines a “whistleblower” as “any individual who provides . . .
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the
Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the
65

Cowley, supra note 8.
MARKOPOLOS, supra note 2, at 3.
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Frontline: The Madoff Affair, Interview with Harry Markopolos (PBS television
broadcast May 12, 2009).
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Id.
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Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6
(2010).
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Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2002).
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Commission.”71 A whistleblower so defined is eligible for an award if
original information provided to the SEC leads to a successful
enforcement action.72 Additionally, the SEC’s regulations implementing
Dodd–Frank provisions contain two discrete whistleblower definitions:
for purposes of the award program, Rule 21F–2 requires a whistleblower
to “provide the Commission with information” relating to possible
securities–law violations.73 For purposes of the anti–retaliation
protections, however, the Rule does not require SEC reporting.74
As such, courts were reluctant to reach a consensus on whether or not
Dodd–Frank necessarily mandated reporting misconduct to the SEC in
order to proceed with a whistleblower claim. Ultimately, conflicting views
of the SEC rule as it pertains to Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower protections
resulted in a circuit split, which was recently resolved by the Supreme
Court in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers.75 The fractured interpretation
of internal versus external reporting leading up to Digital Realty began in
2013 with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA),
LLC.76

1. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC
In Asadi, the Fifth Circuit scaled back protections guaranteed to those
who internally reported violation of securities laws directly to their
employers, rather than to the SEC.77 Breaking away from the prevailing
jurisprudence interpreting the scope of the Dodd–Frank anti–retaliation
protections to extend to internal whistleblowers, Asadi held that
employees who made internal reports within their company, rather than
directly to the SEC, were not covered under Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower
protections.78

71

15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(a)(6).
Id. at § 78u–6(b)–(g).
73
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–2(a)(1).
74
See § 240.21F–2(b)(1)(i)–(ii).
75
See 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018).
76
See 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
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Id. at 625.
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Id. (Khaled Asadi filed a complaint alleging that his employer, G.E. Energy, violated
Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower protection provision by terminating him after he made an
internal report of a possible securities law violation. The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas granted GE Energy’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Asadi was not a “whistleblower” under
Dodd–Frank because the plain language of the Dodd–Frank whistleblower protection
provision creates a private cause of action only for individuals who provide information to
the SEC.).
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The Asadi decision discussed two conflicting provisions of Dodd–
Frank that led to subsequent conflicting interpretations of its protections.79
Subsection (h) of Section 78u–6 of Dodd–Frank provides protections from
retaliation to whistleblowers who “provid[e] information to the SEC” and
“initiat[e], testif[y] in, or assis[t] any investigation or judicial or
administrative action” of the SEC based on this information; or (iii) “in
making disclosures that are required or protected” under specified federal
laws, including those under the SEC’s jurisdiction.80 Ultimately, Asadi
held that the text of Dodd–Frank does not address internal reporting at
all.81 Instead, it only addressed SEC reporting procedures under Sarbanes–
Oxley.82

2. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy
Following Asadi, the Second Circuit created a circuit split via Berman
v. Neo@Ogilvy by holding that an employee fired after reporting securities
violations internally to his employer could seek remedies under Dodd–
Frank.83 The court in Berman ultimately did not resolve the tension
between the definitional section of subsection 21F(a)(6) and subdivision
(iii) of subsection 21(F)(h)(1)(A), but rather held that it created sufficient
ambiguity as to the coverage of subdivision (iii) to oblige the court to give
Chevron deference to the SEC’s rule.84
79

Id. at 623.
Asadi, 720 F.3d at 624.
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Id. at 625.
82
Id.
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See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015) (Daniel Berman
worked as finance director at media agency Neo@Oglivy. During the course of his
employment, Berman discovered fraudulent accounting practices, and reported them
internally. Berman was later terminated in April of 2013. In October of 2013, Berman
reported the suspected fraudulent practices to the SEC and, under the purview of Dodd–
Frank, pursued a whistleblower retaliation lawsuit against his former employer. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment
dismissing Berman’s claims, holding that, in light of the “whistleblower” definition in
Dodd–Frank, only those discharged from employment for reporting alleged violations to
the SEC were protected. The Second Circuit reversed and remanded the case, holding that
Berman may pursue retaliation remedies under Dodd Frank Section 21F, despite having
reported the wrongdoing only internally, but not to the SEC, before his termination.).
84
Id. at 148 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984)) (The Chevron Doctrine refers to judicial deference
given to administrative actions. In Chevron, the Supreme Court set forth a legal test as to
when the court should defer to the agency’s answer or interpretation, holding that such
judicial deference is appropriate where the agency’s answer was not unreasonable, so long
as Congress had not spoken directly to the precise issue at question. According to Chevron,
when a legislative delegation to an administrative agency on a particular issue or question
is implicit rather than explicit, a court may not substitute its own interpretation of the statute
for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrative agency.).
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3. Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers
Faced with fractured case law and inconsistent outcomes from two
Courts of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this
conflict in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers.85 In Digital Realty, the
Supreme Court narrowed the definition of “whistleblower” under Dodd–
Frank and ruled that whistleblowers are only protected against retaliation
from employers under Dodd–Frank if they report allegations of an
employer’s securities law violations to the SEC.86 As a result of Digital
Realty, whistleblowers who report alleged violations through an
employer’s internal compliance program without also reporting to the SEC
will no longer be able to avail themselves of Dodd–Frank’s protections
against retaliation.

B.

Administration: Enforcement and Reporting Procedures

Whistleblower laws arise from and are applied in different contexts,
making it difficult to easily characterize and dissect these laws.87 Because
enforcement of whistleblower laws is not left exclusively to courts,
administrative bodies are crucial in enforcing whistleblower protections;
the investigation of corporate misconduct disclosures and employer
retaliation allegations are largely left to administrative agencies.88
However, institutional failures, particularly within the financial world,
highlight weaknesses within the administrative agencies that are charged
with enforcing whistleblower laws.

1. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”)
Although the SEC is the ultimate regulator of the securities industry,
organizations like The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
85

See 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018).
Id. at 776. (Paul Somers served as Vice President of real estate investment trust,
Digital Realty Trust, Inc., from 2010 to 2014. Somers was allegedly terminated by Digital
Realty shortly after he reported suspected securities violations to senior management.
Somers did not alert the SEC of his termination, nor did he file an administrative complaint
within 180 days of his termination, rendering him ineligible for relief under Sarbanes–
Oxley. Somers brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California alleging a whistleblower retaliation claim under Dodd–Frank. Digital Realty
moved to dismiss that claim, arguing that “Somers does not qualify as a ‘whistleblower’
under [§ 78u–6(h)] because he did not report any alleged law violations to the SEC.” 119
F.Supp.3d, at 1094. The District Court denied the motion, holding that Rule 21F–2 did not
necessitate recourse to the SEC prior to gaining “whistleblower” status under Dodd–Frank.
Finding the statutory scheme ambiguous, the court accorded deference to the SEC’s Rule
under the Chevron doctrine.).
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VAUGHN, supra note 24, at 1.
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(“FINRA”) act as non–governmental private regulators of member
brokerage firms and exchange markets.89 Termination of employees
within member firms must be reported to FINRA, requiring that “when a
registered representative leaves a firm for any reason, the firm must file a
form U5, which is the Uniform Termination Notice for Securities Industry
Registration for self–regulatory organizations (SROs) including FINRA
and states/jurisdictions.”90 The Form U5 must be submitted within 30 days
of the registered representative leaving the firm and generally is required
to be filed electronically. Firms are also required to provide the registered
representative with a copy of their Form U5 within 30 days.91
The U5 is a form in the banking industry that essentially acts as a
permanent report card from all former employers. Several former
employees alleged that Wells Fargo used its U5 reporting power to
retaliate against those who tried to blow the whistle on the bank’s
fraudulent activities.92 Through U5’s, the bank essentially branded
whistleblowing employees with a scarlet letter, potentially damaging
future career prospects.93 To investigate these claims, three Democratic
senators asked FINRA for data on Wells Fargo’s U5 filings. The responses
they received “paint[ed] a disturbing picture,” and the U5 forms
“confirm[ed] that Wells Fargo had ample information about the scope of
fraudulent sales practices” long before it reached settlements with the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.94 As a result of these revelations,
FINRA launched an extensive sweep of broker–dealer cross–selling.95

2. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”)
The breakdown in whistleblowing reporting and regulation procedures
does not stop at FINRA. Because Dodd–Frank extends its whistleblower
protections to workers who report violations of financial consumer
protection laws to their employer, the bureau, or any other federal, state or

89

About FINRA, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/about (last visited Jan. 2, 2017).
Terminate an Individual’s Registration, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/
terminate-individuals-registration (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).
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Id.
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Id.
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Episode 732: Bad Form, Wells Fargo, NPR (Oct. 28, 2016 10:19 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2016/10/28/499805238/episode-732-bad-form-wellsfargo (transcript of podcast episode discussing Wells Fargo scandal).
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Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo Faces Scrutiny for Black Marks on Ex–Employee Files,
NY TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/04/business/
dealbook/wells-fargo-faces-scrutiny-for-black-marks-on-ex-employee-files.html?_r=0.
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local authority,96 the law provides procedures for a covered employee to
file a retaliation complaint with the secretary of labor, and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (hereinafter “OSHA”) is
responsible for processing those complaints.97 In March of 2016, OSHA
laid out the final rules and procedures for employees making
whistleblower retaliation claims under Dodd–Frank.98 The final rule
established conclusive procedures and time frames for the handling of
retaliation complaints under the CFPA, including procedures and time
frames for employee complaints to OSHA.99
Among the bevy of Wells Fargo whistleblowers that emerged after the
scandal, one prominent case was that of former Wells Fargo general
manager Claudia Ponce de Leon; Ponce de Leon was among at least four
other former Wells Fargo employees who filed whistleblower retaliation
complaints in December 2011 with OSHA, alleging termination for telling
superiors about employees opening unauthorized accounts.100 Nearly five
years later, Ponce de Leon still has not been interviewed by OSHA
investigators.101 According to OSHA records, Ponce de Leon’s retaliation
complaint against Wells Fargo for reporting potential misconduct was one
of several dozens filed against the bank over the last 14 years.102
Government regulators are still not meeting targets set by law—a problem
that was also flagged in a critical internal report issued in September
2015.103 OSHA had yet to close out 34 of the 91 complaints it has received
since fiscal year 2002 from Wells Fargo employees alleging they faced
retaliation after reporting potential wrongdoing.104 “It’s absolutely
outrageous that whistleblowers contacted OSHA as early as 2009 about
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Aaron Vehling, OSHA Sets Rules For Dodd–Frank Whistleblowers, LAW360 (Mar.
16, 2016, 8:06 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/772351/osha-sets-rules-for-doddfrank-whistleblowers.
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29 C.F.R. § 1985 (2016).
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Id.
100
Sarah N. Lynch, Wells Fargo complaints show flaws in federal whistleblower
program, REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2016 6:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-wellsfargo-accounts-whistleblower-idUSKCN12D2M0/.
101
Wells Fargo Employees Have a History of Suing the Bank, FORTUNE (Sept. 29, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/09/29/wells-fargo-employees-sue/; see also Liz Wagner & Mark
Villarreal, Former Federal Investigator Says Government Didn’t Investigate Wells Fargo
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potential fraud at Wells Fargo, and yet these government bureaucrats
failed to do their job.”105

a.

Overburdened and Under–resourced

Federal OSHA is a small agency.106 In conjunction with state partners,
OSHA currently employs approximately 2,100 inspectors responsible for
the health and safety of 130 million workers, employed at more than 8
million worksites around the nation—which translates to about one
compliance officer for every 59,000 workers.107 OSHA has 10 regional
offices and 90 local area offices and a budget of $552,787,000 for the 2016
fiscal year.108
Based on these scarce numbers alone, OSHA has been continuously
challenged in its ability to conduct investigations in a timely manner.109 In
2009, U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) examined the
processing times for whistleblower claims and challenges OSHA faced in
administering the program.110 At that time, the GAO found that OSHA
faced two key challenges—it lacked standardized procedures for
adequately ensuring the quality and consistency of investigations.111
Additionally, investigators reported a lack of resources, such as the
requisite training, legal assistance, and equipment that is necessary to do
their jobs.112 The GAO made recommendations intended to improve the
Whistleblower Protection Program and enhance oversight and the
Department of Labor pledged to take action and address most of the
recommendations, however results and improvement remain to be seen
nearly a decade later.113

b.

Success Rates

University of Nebraska–Lincoln’s Professor Richard E. Moberly
conducted numerous empirical studies on corporate whistleblowing, all of
which indicated that there is overall a low success rate in whistle blower
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107
Id.
108
Id.
109
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claims filed with OSHA under Sarbanes–Oxley.114 The study showed that
during the first three years of Sarbanes–Oxley’s implementation, there was
only a 3.6% success rate for whistleblower claims during the initial
administrative process and only a 6.5% success rate for appeals.115 The
study pointed to “administrative recalcitrance and adjudicative
hamstringing” as the main causes of such low success rates for
whistleblowers, and included “improper application by OSHA of SOX’s
favorable burden of proof to the claimant’s detriment, lack of increased
OSHA personnel to handle the massive influx of retaliation cases post–
SOX, OSHA’s lack of expertise to investigate complex financial fraud
cases, and rulings by administrative law judges that narrowly interpret
SOX’s protections” as a non–exhaustive list of reasons for such dismal
results.116 These data–based findings assist in identifying the provisions
and procedures of the Act that do not work as Congress intended and
suggest potential remedies for these statutory and administrative
deficiencies.

c.

Litigation: Jumping through Hoops
i. Arbitrating Entangled Claims

Section 922 of Dodd–Frank contains key provisions exempting
whistleblower claims from mandatory arbitration due to the reality of
employers seeking to avoid civil suit in federal court under Sarbanes–
Oxley by mandating arbitration agreements in employment contracts.117
However, as part of its overall goal to protect whistleblowers and
encourage corporate governance, Section 922(c) of Dodd–Frank
invalidates any “agreement, policy form, or condition of employment,
including a pre–dispute arbitration agreement” that has the effect of
waiving rights and remedies available to Sarbanes–Oxley
whistleblowers.118
114

See Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why
Sarbanes–Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 67, 91–95
(2007) (Professor Moberly conducted an empirical study of all Department of Labor
Sarbanes–Oxley determinations during the first three years of the Act’s implementation.
The results consisted of over 700 separate decisions from administrative investigations and
hearings, of which a detailed analysis demonstrated that administrative decision makers
strictly construed, and in some cases misapplied, Sarbanes–Oxley’s substantive protections
to the significant disadvantage of employees.).
115
Id. at 67.
116
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Dodd–Frank’s ban on pre–dispute arbitration agreements opens the
door to other questions regarding entangled claims that can be brought
under either Sarbanes–Oxley or Dodd–Frank. Some courts have held that
where a common nucleus of operative facts exists between a claim brought
under Sarbanes–Oxley and another claim, then Sarbanes–Oxley, as
amended by Dodd–Frank, bars arbitration of either claims however Courts
have not reached a consensus on the matter.119 The question of whether
these claims are arbitrable is significant because of the disagreement
among federal courts on whether Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank claims
and protections overlap for employees who only report securities
violations internally.

ii. Establishing a Prima Facie Retaliation Case and the
Trouble with Burden–Shifting
Should a whistleblower choose to directly take his or her claim to
court, her or she must then overcome significant hurdles in order to
establish a prima facie retaliation claim. The burden–shifting mechanism
applied in employment discrimination and retaliation claims poses a near–
impossible challenge to plaintiffs when alleging the elements of such
claims.120 In addition to the administrative issues involving whistleblower
protections, there remains an inherent Catch–22 with establishing a prima
facie retaliation claim under Dodd–Frank. Employees need to demonstrate
that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action.
The employer, however, can defend by demonstrating through clear and
convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action absent the
protected activity.
Burden–shifting mechanisms are particularly troublesome for
corporate governance because they act as a way for employers to insulate
themselves and avoid liability. To remedy this—there should be an
allowance for a de facto finding of the “contributing factor” element in
cases involving companies that are under investigation for fraudulent or
unethical business practices. Alternatively, involvement in a pending
investigation related to the employees’ whistleblowing claim could bar
employers from showing that the employee would have been fired
regardless. While Dodd–Frank also provides a private right of action for
employees who have suffered retaliation, problems establishing a prima

119

Id.; see also Laubenstein v. Conair Corp., No. 5:14–CV–05227, 2014 WL 6609164,
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120
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facie claim get in the way of withstanding dismissal and hinder achieving
effective corporate governance and compliance.121

d.

Compensation: Incentivizing Corporate Governance
for the Citizen Employee

The Dodd–Frank Act also creates numerous incentives for
whistleblowing, including a bounty paid to eligible whistleblowers who
voluntarily provide the SEC with original information leading to a
successful enforcement action in which the SEC recovers monetary
sanctions in an amount of $1 million.122 Section 922 of the Dodd–Frank
Act provides “powerful” monetary incentives for whistleblowers to report
securities law violations to the SEC. Pursuant to section 21F,
“whistleblowers” who “voluntarily” provide the Commission with
“original” information about violations of securities laws shall be awarded
a share of between 10% and 30% of monetary sanctions ultimately
imposed by the Commission where the sanctions exceed $1 million.123
However, the Wells Fargo scandals illustrate the futility of this provision
in certain scenarios.
Critics argue that the bounty program is fundamentally flawed because
it attempts to “combat corporate opportunism by encouraging employee
opportunism.”124 Because the SEC does not require corporate
whistleblowers to report violations internally to their employer first to be
eligible for a bounty, critics argue that the financial incentives discourage
internal reporting.125 However, in reality, mandating internal
whistleblowing would likely dissuade whistleblowers from coming
forward altogether. The SEC’s approach credits “incentivizing–rather than
requiring–internal reporting” as more likely to promote compliance by
corporations. 126
The Dodd–Frank Act’s additional whistleblower retaliation
protections, though sound in theory, are ultimately unworkable in practice.
In most modern fraud cases, the involvement and pleas of whistleblowers
are typically brought to light ex post. High–profile corporate frauds all
seem to follow a similar pattern. Misconduct is discovered first, followed
by the long–ignored warnings of whistleblowers. This directly undermines
the whistleblowing protection afforded by Dodd–Frank Act and its
121
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purpose in encouraging compliance and corporate governance. The
whistleblower provision was meant to facilitate a more ex ante approach
to governance, where whistleblowers are given an avenue that they can
utilize in order to be heard and prevent companies’ fraudulent or unethical
practices from reaching the point that Wells Fargo has. While
whistleblowers act as a corporate moral compass and are essential in
revealing and preventing corporate fraud and understanding the truth
behind sophisticated corporate and securities fraud,127 offering bounty
incentives to those who risk their careers to improve toxic corporate
practices will ultimately be rendered useless in facilitating corporate
governance until the ambiguity is reporting and administrative procedures
is addressed and improved.

IV.

HOW TO FIX IT

The challenges in encouraging whistleblowers illustrate the pervasive
issue of regulatory capture as it relates to the financial industry.128 Reports
over the last decade present a mixed perspective as to the effectiveness of
federal regulation regarding the protection of whistleblowers.129 In 2003,
the National Advisory Committee on Occupational Safety and Health
(hereinafter “NACOSH”) charged that OSHA had a “dismal record” of
protecting whistleblowers and pointed to the declining number of
complaints being filed with the agency as evidence that workers’
confidence in OSHA’s ability to protect them was waning.130 Other
concerns voiced included the increased responsibility that Congress was
giving to OSHA to enforce whistleblower protection in areas beyond
safety and health, starting with Sarbanes–Oxley in 2003 and additionally,
Dodd–Frank in 2010.131
OSHA currently only employs 88 investigators working out of 10
regional offices to handle whistleblower claims nationwide—OSHA is a
small agency given the size of its mission.132 There is a need for expansion,
with more personnel handling retaliation claims. Additionally, OSHA
should liaise with agencies such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Federal Trade
Commission, and National Labor Relations Board in reviewing Dodd–
127
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Frank and Sarbanes–Oxley related claims. Alternatively, compliance and
auditing investigations could be outsourced to neutral third–party
companies as well.
The GAO’s 2009 report suggested that better data and improved
oversight would help ensure quality and consistency of whistleblower
protection programs.133 Based on the GAO’s findings, the Department of
Labor lacked reliable information on processing times and, as a result,
could not accurately report how long it took to investigate and close a case
or decide on certain appeals.134 OSHA does not have an effective
mechanism to ensure that the data are accurately recorded in its database,
and GAO’s file reviews revealed that the key dates are often inaccurately
recorded in the database or cannot be verified due to a lack of supporting
documentation.135 At the appeals level, the reliability of information on the
processing times is mixed.136 At all levels of the whistleblower program,
GAO found that increasing caseloads, case complexity, and
accommodating requests from the parties’ legal counsel affect case
processing times.137 While OSHA administers whistleblower statutes, its
main area of expertise is on general labor and employment matters.
Securities fraud, being a complex area of law, requires a sophisticated
understanding of financial and accounting practices that OSHA
investigators generally do not have. OSHA would function most
effectively at administering whistleblower laws and helping achieve
corporate governance if it provided the requisite training, background, or
experience to its investigators in order to assess these claims. Additionally,
expanding OSHA’s limited scope of authority to include the power to
subpoena companies to submit documents or order witnesses to testify
would create a greater compliance culture within companies.138
In 2009, the GAO found that many of OSHA’s shortcomings could be
attributed to that fact that it did not “routinely conduct independent audits
of the program to ensure consistent application of its policies and
procedures.”139 Although OSHA developed a field audit program to
remedy this, the GAO found several deficiencies in the program.140 For
example, the auditing process did not operate independently, which is an
important aspect in ensuring fair and effective auditing.141 In 2010, the
133
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GAO followed up with another report on OSHA’s Whistleblower
Protection Program, finding that sustained management attention was
needed to address long–standing program weaknesses.142
Evidently, OSHA has struggled with ongoing scrutiny of its ability to
handle the responsibilities conferred to it through Sarbanes–Oxley and
Dodd–Frank. The lack of an efficient administrative apparatus in place for
handling whistleblower claims largely contributes to the breakdown and
inability to ensure proper protection that would meaningfully contribute to
corporate governance. If, for instance, OSHA was better–equipped to
handle the administration of the Whistleblower Protection Program,
employees may feel more empowered to make reports knowing that they
will be taken seriously and their claims would be handled expediently.
However, the lack of resources and lengthy processing times often lead to
individuals, including many who were connected with Wells Fargo, to feel
discouraged and often withdraw their claims altogether. This ultimately
does little to help with corporate governance in situations like the Wells
Fargo debacle because these complaints are ignored, often for years, and
by the time they are given any attention the instances of fraud and
malfeasance being complained about may already be public knowledge.

A.

Collaboration

Most recently, in 2014 the GAO released its latest report on OSHA’s
Whistleblower Protection Program, suggesting that opportunities exist for
OSHA and the Department of Transportation, in particular, to strengthen
collaborative mechanisms.143 While this report was specifically aimed at
the automotive industry and transportation workers, many of the
deficiencies can also be seen and improved upon in the financial industry
as well. The GAO generally works to encourage the idea of collaboration
between agencies. The 2014 report in fact stated “[i]n our past work, we
concluded that collaboration is critical when meaningful results that the
federal government seeks to achieve require the coordinated efforts of
more than one federal agency.”144 However, OSHA’s role with respect to
whistleblowing in the financial context is particularly unique from other
contexts and makes interagency collaboration more complex. In the
financial context, OSHA focuses on the retaliation issue rather than the
evaluation of whistleblower disclosures, which is passed off to the SEC
142

See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO–10–722, WHISTLEBLOWER
PROTECTION PROGRAM: SUSTAINED MANAGEMENT ATTENTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS
LONG–STANDING PROGRAM WEAKNESSES 1 (2009).
143
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO–14–286, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
PROGRAM: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST FOR OSHA AND DOT TO STRENGTHEN COLLABORATIVE
MECHANISMS 26 (2009).
144
Id. at 12.

2018]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

81

and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”).145 Therefore,
OSHA is not entirely at fault for the administrative allocation of handling
whistleblower cases.
Obviously, former–Wells Fargo employees and whistleblowers who
speak out in general are concerned with employer retaliation and having
adequate procedures in place to deal with retaliation would make people
more willing to come forward. However, before delving into the role
retaliation plays in whistleblower protections, it makes sense to first make
OSHA more efficient in dealing with these complaints thereby improve
regulatory compliance more generally. Interagency collaboration may
create more accountability and various outlets for aggrieved
whistleblowers to seek. For example, a cursory glance at the OSHA
Whistleblower Investigations Manual shows that there are clearly
technical issues as to whether the whistleblower’s original complaint
related to violations of the relevant statutes, which is a matter about which
the SEC would have technical expertise that OSHA might not have,
therefore warranting the argument for interagency collaboration.146

B.

Compensation

The Wells Fargo context, in particular, illustrates an all–too–common
situation in which Dodd–Frank’s bounty provision fails to encourage good
business practices and effective corporate governance.147 This incentive is
rendered completely irrelevant in many cases because the whistleblowers’
claims are ignored or mishandled by OSHA at the very outset, foreclosing
the possibility of ever receiving bounty payment.148 Additionally, the
ambiguity surrounding internal and external reporting in order to receive
Dodd–Frank protections creates another hurdle for employees to
overcome before having the bounty option available to them, thus
discouraging reporting and further hindering corporate oversight.
Settlements in particular are also often a problematic variable in the
context of whistleblowing and corporate governance. The utilization of
whistleblowers to facilitate corporate governance relies heavily on the fact
that the revelation of corporate malfeasance will act as a deterrent and help
encourage a culture of compliance within companies. However, because
settlements are often not made public and decided out of court, companies
often benefit from quietly settling and not having whistleblower
145
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allegations publicized, as was the case with numerous Wells Fargo
whistleblowers leading up to 2016.149

C.

Corporate Culture and Internal Policy Implementation

Clearly, there is also a need for top–down reform in practices dealing
with corporate compliance strategies. Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf’s
congressional hearing proved that Congress’ attempt at facilitating such
reform through Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank failed when Stumpf
pleaded ignorance as to what was going on and blamed low–level
employees for the company’s transgressions.150 Corporate culture starts at
the top and a development of a code of conduct or ethics and its
implementation by a board would raise institutional and investor
awareness. Similar to the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct
Authority,151 Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank need an ancillary
enforcement organization that will ensure guidance for employees on both
senior and lower levels regarding their “duties of responsibility.” This
organization or committee should independently conduct compliance
audits of both corporations and administrative bodies like OSHA
supplemented by supervisory reviews on multiple levels for large financial
corporations. Additionally, employees need to be fully aware of different
avenues of relief and protection they have in the workplace. This includes
having a detailed training on the reporting procedures under Sarbanes–
Oxley and Dodd–Frank, as well as of respective company conduct and
ethics policies in order to further build transparency and trust.
Working at large institutions dilutes transparency and trust, especially
when employees are unaware of what is happening at the top. Appointing
strong compliance officers at all levels will give employees a stronger
sense of transparency, trust, and oversight. This also works hand–in–hand
with the idea of collaboration, which calls for more cooperation between
companies like Wells Fargo and agencies like OSHA and the SEC. More
OSHA or regulatory personnel interacting with and being available to
employees would create a better sense of comfort amongst those who are
considering whistleblowing, while also simultaneously creating a safer
company culture.
149
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V.
A FORECAST ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
The dismantling of Dodd–Frank has been highly anticipated since the
election of President Trump.152 Earlier this year, for instance, Senate
passed a bipartisan measure to remove dozens of banks from under the
purview of Dodd–Frank.153 Many view the Financial CHOICE Act, a bill
sponsored by Congressman Jeb Hensarling, as a possible successor to
Dodd–Frank.154 The Financial CHOICE Act in its current form, however,
does not alter either the whistleblower reward programs or the enhanced
whistleblower protections of Dodd–Frank.155 Even if the whistleblower
reward programs survive, the designation of resources to these programs
and the amount of payouts will likely decline.156 Many commentators in
the securities industry have theorized that the SEC is poised to decrease
corporate sanctions and possibly become more hostile towards
whistleblowers under the new leadership President Trump appoints.157
Whistleblower protections, even if repealed under Dodd–Frank would
still be available through Sarbanes–Oxley and state laws, although less
robust.158 The scope of covered employees would likely diminish and the
longer statute of limitations as well as private right to a federal cause of
action would no longer be available.159 Additionally, depending on who
President Trump selects for appointment to federal and administrative
judge positions, we may begin to see a shift towards more stringent
applications of whistleblower protection laws.160 One thing, however, is
certain: the realm of financial regulation and corporate governance is set
to sail into uncharted territories under the Trump administration
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CONCLUSION

The role of the corporate whistleblower has long been revered yet
viewed with skepticism in modern American society. Despite attempts at
affording protections to whistleblowers, safeguards have been an
acknowledged yet often overlooked issue in American history. Within the
private sector, the whistleblower plays an imperative role in facilitating
corporate governance and yet the protections current statutes afford
whistleblowers are insufficient and seldom achieve compliance or
encourage good corporate behavior. While regulation like Sarbanes–
Oxley and Dodd–Frank provide redress to whistleblowers, the
administration of such regulations and the apparatus in place to enforce
them has been largely ineffective. Additionally, the Digital Realty
decision may potentially undercut corporations’ internal compliance
programs. Institutional failures and under resourced agencies make it
particularly difficult for both whistleblower protections and corporate
governance to coexist harmoniously—ultimately seeming destined for
failure. Rather than reforming legislation, agencies such as OSHA must
look internally to improve the handling of whistleblower claims if there is
truly any corporate governance to be achieved. The nature of financial
fraud and corporate malfeasance is inherently dependent on the fast–paced
dynamic nature of the financial industry, and thus, the institutions in place
for handling whistleblower complaints should be designed to react as such.
Until then, as long as we keep putting corporate governance on the
backburner, the wolves of Wall Street will keep winning and the expense
of whistleblowers.

